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HarvardJournalofLaw & Technology
Volume 10, Number 3 Summer 1997
CYBERSPACE SOVEREIGNTY? - THE INTERNET AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
Timothy S. Wu*
Governments ofthe IndustrialWorld, you weary giants
offlesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new
home ofthe Mind. On behalfof thefuture,jaskyou of
the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.'
By linking with the Internet, we don't mean absolute
freedom of information. I think there is a general
understandingabout this. Ifyou go through customs,
you have to show your passport. It's the same with
management ofinformation. There is no contradiction
at all between the development oftelecommunications
infrastructureand the exercise ofstate sovereignty.'
Will cyberspace exercise its own sovereignty? Does it do so already?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .....................................

II. THE FEASIBILIY OF CYBERSPACE REGULATION ...........
Content Regulation ..............................
1. Regulation via Hardware ......................
2. Regulation via Software ......................
B. Activity Regulation ..............................
A.

648

649
650
651
652
655

* J.D., Harvard Law School, Class of 1998. The author would like to acknowledge
the help of Lawrence Lessig and Anne-Marie Slaughter in the preparation of this Note. In

addition, the author is thankful for helpful discussions with John Perry Barlow, Jonathan
Yong-Sung Kang, FemandaLai, QuaidMorris, Richard A. Posner, George Wang, Jonathan
Zittrain, and the participants in the Seminar on Law & Cyberspace taught by Professor
Lessig at Harvard Law School.
1. John Perry BarlowA Declarationofthelndependence ofCyberspace(visited Feb.
13, 1997) <http:/wwv.eff.orglpub/Publications/JohnPerryBarlow/barlow_0296.
declaration>.
2. Much ofthe InformationHighwayStill to Be Paved,THE STRAMIs TIMES, Nov. 25,
1995, at Ll (quoting Wu Jichuan, Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, People's
Republic of China).

HarvardJournalofLaw & Technology
III.

[Vol. 10

INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND THE INTERNET ............

A. Some Assumptions of the InstitutionalistApproach .....
B. Institutionalismand the Internet ...................
C. Problems with the InstitutionalistApproach
as Applied to the Internet .........................

656
657
658
660

IV. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE
INTERNET .........................................
A. Assumptions of the Liberal Theory ..................
B. The Shape of CyberspaceSovereignty underLiberal
Theory ........................................

V. CoNcLusION ......................................

661
661
662
665

I. INTRODUCTION
There is no shortage of discussion concerning the operation of law
in cyberspace. Some writers conclude that regulating cyberspace is
really nothing new; others argue that cyberspace ought not to be
regulated, or is impossible to regulate.' Certain exponents of the latter
view have approached the question more broadly, asserting that
cyberspace does or should enjoy a kind of international sovereignty.
Probably the most outspoken advocates of "cyberspace sovereignty," as
this idea is called, are the Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF")4 and
Wiredmagazine. David Johnson and David Post- both associated with
the EFF - have recently presented a comprehensive argument for
cyberspace sovereignty.'
Proponents of cyberspace sovereignty usually present a normative
argument - that nations should respect the rules of cyberspace.6
However they often make a descriptive, or predictive, statement as well:
they claim that the "territorial" powers of the world will, or already do,
respect an emergent cyberspace sovereignty. Such writers generally

3. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Pathof Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744
(1995); John T. Delacourt, The InternationalImpactofInternetRegulation,38 HARv.INT'L

L.J. 207 (1997).
4. The Electronic Frontier Foundation is probably the best known and best funded
organization advocating the freedom of the Internet and other technologies from government
regulation. See generally The ElectronicFrontierFoundation<http://www.eff.org>.
5. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise ofLaw in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). David Johnson is a former chairman of the
EFF, and David Post is a Policy Fellow ofthe EFF. Both are co-directors ofthe Cyberspace
Law Institute. See CyberspaceLaw Institute <http://www.cli.org>.
6. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supranote 5, at 1391-95.
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assert that state regulation of the Internet will be impossible or futile. If
this assertion is correct, cyberspace sovereignty will be a reality.
Moreover, it could be the case that states will simply choose, for selfinterested reasons, not to regulate cyberspace.
This Note examines two related questions: First, is it possible for
nation states to regulate the Internet? Second, assuming that it is
possible, will nation states regulate the Internet? Part II addresses the
first question, arguing that Johnson and Post's descriptive assumptions
are incorrect, and that Internet regulation, although difficult, is possible
and stands to become increasingly so regardless of its desirability on
normative grounds.7 Parts III and IV address the second question: to
what extent will states choose to regulate cyberspace? To answer this
question we turn to models of state behavior in international relations
theory. Part III examines cyberspace under an institutionalist framework,
borrowing a set of assumptions identified with the realist theory of
international relations. On this theory, which regards the international
system as a homogenous community of power-maximizing actors,
cyberspace sovereignty will be very narrow and largely defined by
collective interest at the state level. Part III also examines some
problems with the realist assumptions in the Internet context, and leads
to the conclusion that the liberal theory of international relations may be
more applicable. Part IV examines Internet regulation under that theory.
The conclusion is that, under the assumptions of the liberal theory, the
promulgation of widely acceptable cyberspace standards and norms may
lead first individuals, and then states, to reach a consensus regarding
what can be termed a "minimally sovereign" cyberspace.

II. THE FEASIBILITY OF CYBERSPACE REGULATION
Proponents of cyberspace sovereignty generally assert that it is
impossible or futile for governments to regulate the Internet. In the
words of John Perry Barlow: "I declare the global social space we are
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you [the governments] seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do
you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear."'
Two varieties of Internet regulation must be considered here. Under the
first, content regulation, the state controls the access of its citizens to the

7. There may also be good reason to question the normative arguments made by
Johnson and Post. For a criticism of these arguments, especially the argument that the
"effects" of actions in cyberspace are not geographically based, see Lawrence Lessig, The
Zones of Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1407-10 (1996).
8. Barlow, supra note 1.
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materials available in cyberspace. Under the second, activity regulation,
the state controls the actions that take place in or through cyberspace.
A. Content Regulation
Canvassing several different forms of government content regulation, Johnson and Post conclude that each is impracticable or
impossible.9 They are correct that perfect regulation of content is
impossible, and that the Internet does make regulation especially
difficult. But where the state can raise the costs of accessing forbidden
content to a sufficient level, it can effectively deter most users from
receiving undesired content. Often, the best way for states to do this is
to implement or require changes in the hardware and software that allow
cyberspace to exist. Several commentators note that governments have
begun to regulate the software and hardware of the Internet. l" Such
regulation represents a profound shift in government responses to the
Internet, and one that may prove especially effective." At present, and
to varying degrees, many states seem to have the power to do this. The
following analysis will consider hardware- and software-based regulation, and then describe some actual attempts by nation states to implement this kind of regulation.

9. See Johnson & Post, supranote 5, at 1370-76. The descriptive claims in Law and
Borders seem more extreme than any made elsewhere by either author. For example,
Johnson has written that "even those who might go the extreme with such a view, perhaps
advocating 'sovereignty' for the net, nevertheless must recognize that plodding old territorial
sovereigns will continue to assertjurisdiction and make [law] about what happens online."
David R. Johnson, Jurisdictional Quid Pro Quo and the Law of Cyberspace
<http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/DavidJohnson/>. Similarly, the "evolutionary"

approach to the cyberspace rule set advocated elsewhere by Post rests on a weaker
descriptive claim that government regulation will be futile. See David G. Post, Anarchy,
State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art.
3 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/jol/post.html>.

10. "Hardware regulation" refers to control over the physical components of the
network- for example, controlling what is connected to what. "Software regulation"
refers to government control over the computer programs used to manage information. This
distinction is not airtight: many functions can be implemented equally well using software
or hardware.
11. That regulation by code is especially effective does not mean that it is necessarily
good or bad. Cyberspace has been described as a "software world" where the "code is the
law." See, e.g., M. Ethan Katsh, Software Worlds and the FirstAmendment: Virtual
Doorkeepersin Cyberspace,1996 U. CHI.LEGALF. 335(1996). However, it seems equally
true that cyberspace is a hardware world. For the relevance of this for government
regulation of the Internet, see, e.g., Lessig, supra note 7, at 1408.
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1. Regulation via Hardware
Johnson and Post assert that because "individual electrons can
easily, and without any realistic prospect of detection, 'enter' any
sovereign's territory," controlling the flow of electronic information
across borders is impossible. 2 It is not clear, however, how this
conclusion follows from the premise. First of all, at least for the Internet,
electrons are not the relevant unit - Internet Protocol ("IP") packets are.
And in order for IP packets to enter a particular territory, certain physical
components must be present there. By exercising control over the
physical components required for Internet access, the state can regulate
cyberspace.
At the most basic level, a state can simply choose not to have any
connection to the Internet. Of course this means that the state must
forego the considerable benefits of Internet communications, including
electronic commerce and the increased prosperity it may bring. 3
Nevertheless, states that fear for their ability to regulate the Internet
could choose this option. As of July 1996, at least thirty-three states
were completely unconnected. 4 At another level, the state can compel
the creation of a hierarchical network and then impose control over the
top level router in that hierarchy (the gateway host). 5 By controlling the
gateway to a subnet,16 the state can regulate the Internet in its territory.
It does not seem relevant whether government control of the gateway
components is direct (the government owns the components) or indirect
(the government regulates Internet service providers). The point is that
where widespread usage of the Internet depends on physical components,
a government that controls these components can regulate cyberspace.

12. Johnson & Post, supranote 5, at 1372. Johnson and Post assert that this is true at

least for countries that "hope to participate in global commerce." Id. There is a clear
conflict between the desire to reap the economic benefits ofthe Internet on the one hand and
the desire to regulate it on the other. This issue is considered more fully infra at note 54 and
accompanying text. Note, however, that two of the countries considered here, China and

Singapore, have effectively imposed regulation on the Internet yet still participate in the
global economy. Johnson and Post also make implicit reference to a division in state

attitudes to the Internet between Western and non-Western countries. For a discussion of
relevance of regional attitudes for cyberspace sovereignty, see infra Part IV.
13. For a discussion of this cost-benefit calculation, see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
14. See Editorial: State of the Internet,July 1996, MATUX MAPS Q., July 1996, at 3,
availableat <http://www3.mids.org/mmq/304/pubhtml/ed.html>.
15. The gateway host is the point of entry, or gate, through which all information must
pass if it is to enter or leave the network. A router is a piece of hardware that sends
incoming packets to their intended destinations, based on the addresses they bear.
16. A subnet is a network connected to the main network (here the entire Internet) at
only one point (the gateway host).
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Of course the barriers imposed by gateway servers may be overcome. First, the user can use normal telephone lines to dial up a provider
outside the subnet in question. Second, the user can send or receive
encrypted information. Because it is nearly impossible for the government to determine the content of encrypted messages, regulation of such
content will be difficult. However, these "exit options" from state
control are probably of such a high cost, financially or in terms of
necessary expertise, as to render them marginal to the discussion. 7
The best example of a country pursuing subnet-based regulation of
the Internet is China. With the help of several United States companies,
China has already built two major government-operated intranets
connected to the rest of the Internet through a limited number of
regulated servers.' The China Wide Web, a subnet that will connect all
of China's major population centers and provide Chinese language
content, is supposed to begin operation soon. 9 It too will have controlled contacts with the Internet.
2. Regulation via Software
Another form of content regulation discussed by Johnson and Post
is the software barrier, which they predict "will likely fail as well."20 But
again, the evidence for this view seems slender. There are two loci
where software regulation is most effective - at the router level and at
the end user level. At the router level, Internet regulation is typically
accomplished through use of a firewall, or comprehensive system of
network filtration and control, implemented typically at a gateway
router.2' A major component of a firewall system is what is called a
17. See Joshua Gordon, EastAsian Censors Want to Net the Internet,THE CHRisTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 12, 1996, at 19 ("Restrictions in China and Singapore now put the last
source of uncensored news firmly out of the reach for all but the wealthiest and most
dedicated Internet hackers in those countries.").
18. See Sheila Teffi, ChinaAttempts to Have Its Net and Censor It Too, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 5, 1996, at 1; Graham Hutchings, Beifing Builds BarriersAgainst an
ElectronicDemocracy Wall, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 15, 1996 at 38; ChinaHas 100,000
Internet Subscribers,XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Jan. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Xinhua File.
19. See Bay Networks to Provide Corefor China Wide Web, XNHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Jan. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File; Michael Laris, The Price
of the Deal,NEWSWEEK, Dec. 9, 1996, at 44; Chris McCall, ChinaGoes Online a Bit with
Limited-Access "Intranet,"AGENCEFRANCEPRESSE, March 31,1997, availablein LEXIS,
World Library, Allnws File.
20. Johnson & Post, supranote 5, at 1374.
21. See JOHN WACK & LISA CARNAHAN, KEEPINGYOUR SITE COMFORTABLY SECURE:
AN INTRODUCTIONTO INTERNErFIREWALLs (National Inst. ofStandards and Tech. Special
Pub. No. 800-10, 1995), available at <http:llcsrc.ncsl.nist.gov/nistpubs/800-101>. The
Rotherwick Firewall Resource web site has a collection of "must read" papers. See Zeuros
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packet filtration router. Such a router can filter out packets coming from
or going to specific IP addresses. This allows the owner of the firewall
system to prevent inside users from accessing outside sites, or vice
versa.22 Much of what is considered the "free" Intemet at present is
already privately regulated through the use of firewalls, typically by
corporations.' There does not seem to be any intrinsic reason why
nation states will "fail" using similar technology. As a part of the subnet
system discussed above, China is presently investing considerable energy
in the development of a "digital Great Wall of China 24 for its intranets
using firewall technology developed by or with the assistance of United
States companies.
Singapore also relies on firewall technology,
especially proxy servers.26
At the end-user level, the state can rely on what is called "end-user
filtering software" to filter out content. Recently there has been
enormous development in the sophistication of end-user filtration
systems. Most significantly, wide adoption of the PICS protocol would
allow both sensitive and thorough content filtration, at least for the
World Wide Web. Where every site is reliably PICS rated, private
individuals using PICS compatible browsers can elect not to receive
undesirable content based on several content variables, such as violence,

NetworkSolutions, The "MustReads"<http:llwww.zeuros.co.uklfirewall/mustread.htm>.
22. Of course, actual firewall systems are more complicated than the simple packet
filtration router system described here. A typical component is an application gateway that
protects certain sites. If an outside or insider user wishes to access these sites with an
application program, she must allow the gateway host itself to run the application using
proxy softvare. In this way the host can monitor the purposes for which the application is
being used, and filter any necessary content.
23. See John S. Quarterman & Smoot Carl-Mitchell, What is the Internet,Anyway?,
MATIX NEWS, August 1994, art. 1, available at <http:www3.mids.orgmn/2>. Note that
the Internet may not be as pervasive an unregulated network as many assume, because so
much of what is considered part of the Internet is firewalled off. See id.
24. Louise Kehoe, A Tricky Decision: Eagle Eye, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at 14.
25. See Laris, supra note 19, at 44.
26. For a brief explanation of proxy servers, see supra note 22. For a more detailed
analysis ofthe Singaporean system, see Peng Hwa Ang & BerlindaNadarajan, Censorship
and the Internet: A SingaporeanPerspective, CoMM. ACM, June 1996, at 72. More
information on the Internet regulation scheme in Singapore is available at the Singapore
Broadcasting Authority web site. See SBA Safeguards Community Interest Through
Internet Regulation <http://www.sba.gov.sgnetreg/regrel.htm>.
27. The PICS protocol seems likely to become the new standard for Internet content
labeling. As it becomes more pervasive, a consequence will likely be easier regulation of
the World Wide Web by nation states. For a general overview, see Paul Resnick & James
Miller, PICS: InternetAccess Controls Without Censorship, CoMM. ACM, Oct. 1996, at
87, available at <http:llwww.w3.org/pubWWW/PICS/iacwcv2.htm>; Paul Resnick,
FilteringInformation on the Internet, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997, at 62. See also Jonathan
Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASnIGS COMm. &ENT. LJ.(forthcoming 1997), available
at <http://www.msen.com/-weinbergrating.htm>.
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sex, and so forth. Theoretically, such screening can be done with
complete accuracy.28 End-user filtering software may also be used to
facilitate state control over Internet content. For example, a state could
require by law that all-browsers made available in the country come
equipped with filtration software. This regulation would be easier to
avoid than router regulation, because the filtration program would be in
the hands of end users. Furthermore, pirated browsers would likely
proliferate.29 Yet insofar as the bundled filtration software served to
increase the costs of exit from the state's rule set, such regulation will be
another means by which the state can effectively regulate cyberspace.
China and Singapore furnish the paradigm for effective cyberspace
regulation. The point here is not that the regulation exercised by China
and Singapore is perfect - of course it is not. What matters is that, by
all accounts, these nations have been able to limit the activity of ordinary
users.3" So far these users have accepted the restrictions, or at least have
not considered them worth complaining about." It might be argued that
China and Singapore are bizarre examples of Internet regulation, made
uniquely possible only by a combination of limited Internet connections
and a strong government. Or perhaps because so many Asian countries
are planning to or already regulate the Internet, this can be considered a
regional quirk.32 Yet many of the descriptive claims for cyberspace
sovereignty seem plausible only in the face of a highly decentralized
network and a limited government. Such features are characteristic of
Western liberal democracy in general, and American society in particular; in the world's nations they are absent. There is a reason, then, to

28. See Weinberg, supra note 27. At least in the United States, end-user Internet

filtering software has been touted by free speech activists and Communications Decency
Act litigators as an answer to government regulation of content. See id.
29. A state could deal with this problem to some extent by requiring users to register
their browsers; the state could then check whether the browser were authorized before
permitting the transfer of content.
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Jeffrey Schiller makes the point that
even ordinary users can quickly and easily gain access to the security-cracking tools of an
expert. Jeffrey Schiller, Internet Rights Versus Internet Security, Talk Sponsored by the

M.I.T. Technology and Culture Forum (Mar. 18, 1997). However, even getting these expert
tools probably involves effort and learning beyond what ordinary users can be expected to
undertake.
31. See OpeningInternet Roads into China; Software Giants Are Set to Provide
Access, Undaunted by Threats of State Controls, S.F. ExAMINER, Sept. 12, 1996, at BI
("Service providers, which have proliferated in recent months, say that they have had few
complaints from clients unable to access some sites and that enthusiasm for the Internet is
undiminished."). This may of course change with time and exposure to the Internet.
32. See Gordan, supranote 17.
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question the arguments for cyberspace sovereignty inasmuch as they
seem to make sense only in particular contexts.33
B. Activity Regulation
Adherents of cyberspace sovereignty assert as well that regulation
of activities pursued in or through cyberspace is futile. The basis for this
claim is best laid out by David Post in Anarchy, State, andthe Internet:
An Essay on Law Making in Cyberspace.34 There, Post emphasizes that
the Internet represents a highly accessible "exit-option" from the
territorial rule set. He offers two reasons. First, discovering illegal
behavior is costly in a decentralized network. Second, local prohibitions
on information and services (such as pornography) will lose their force
where individuals can use the Internet to obtain such content from
servers located in less restrictive jurisdictions.3"
Or so they say. Yet mysteriously we find Robert and Carleen
Thomas in federal prison," joining a list of convicts that includes people
like Bob Morris, Phiber Optik,37 and an individual in Singapore who was
subjected to massive fines for downloading pornographic material from
the Internet.38 Though it may be difficult, detecting illegal behavior on
the Web is far from impossible. Naturally, the powerful search
capabilities available in cyberspace help. And it is unclear that the
difficulties of detection in cyberspace are any greater than those posed
by many traditional kinds of illegal behavior.
The force of the second point - that illegal activities will seep in
from other jurisdictions - seems limited. States can still go after any
suppliers of illegal content who have contacts with the jurisdiction. If
33. The possibility that different states will entertain differing attitudes towards the
Internet between states is treated below. See infra Part IV. For additional criticism of
Johnson and Post's descriptive arguments, see Lessig, supra note 7, at 1404-06.
34. Post, supranote 9.
35. See id. 39-41.
36. Robert and Carleen Thomas were the operators of the Amateur Action BBS, a
purveyor ofsexually explicit GIF files. They were sentenced to 30 and 37 months in prison
by a United States district court after a postal inspector in Tennessee downloaded GIF files
from their BBS and reported them. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,704-07 (6th
Cir. 1996).
37. Bob Morris was convicted of using the Internet Worm, a program he had written,
to obtain access to federal computers in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1986 § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1994). He was sentenced to three years of
probation, 400 hours of community service, and a fine of $10,050. See United States v.
Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1991). Phiber Optik is a famous hacker who served
over 10 months in prison; he was also sentenced to probation and 600 hours of community
service. See Paula Span, Modem Operandi: PhiberOptik, BadBoy Hacker, Out ofStir
and On-Line, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1995, at B1.
38. See Gordan, supra note 17.
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this kind of direct state regulation is avoidable at all, it will require
physical relocation.39 Many states have been and will be able to regulate
behavior beyond their borders.4" Though the ease of Internet communication does exacerbate the problem of foreign suppliers, states can
always respond by turning to content regulation of the type discussed in
the previous section.
Thus states do have the power to regulate the Internet; the interesting
question becomes whether they will choose to do so. Answering this
question requires an analysis of the international system, to which we
now turn.
III. INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND THE INTERNET
One approach we might adopt in answering this question is the
realist or institutionalist view of international regimes. One author has
defined the concept of an international regime to comprehend "sets of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issuearea."4 ' It may be useful to think of cyberspace as a kind of international
regime. Under the institutionalist view, states will adhere to the rules of
this regime if and only if it is in their rational interest to do so.42

39. An example is Playboy's trademark infi-ngement action against the "Playmen" web
site. See Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8435 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); see also John T. Soma, TransnationalExtraditionfor ComputerCrimes: Are new
Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. (forthcoming 1997).
40. For example, the United States forced Panama's head of state, Manuel Noriega, to
stand trial in Miami for drug-related charges. See Noriega's Guilt,andItsAftertaste, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1992, at 1, 24.

41. Stephen D. Krasner, StructuralCauses and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables,in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
Krasner defines principles as "beliefs offact, causation, and rectitude," norms as "standards

of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations," rules as "specific prescriptions or
proscriptions for action," and decision-making procedures as "prevailing practices for
Another definition of regimes is that of
making and implementing collective choice." Id.
"governing arrangements" that include "networks of rules, norms, and procedures that
regularize behavior and control its effects." ROBERT O.KEOHANE & JOSEPH S.NYE, POVER
AND INTERDEPENDENCE 19 (1977). Professor Slaughter makes the point that in many
respects, the development ofregime theory was simply a rediscovery of international law.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw andInternationalRelations Theory:
ADualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 219-22 (1993).
42. See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DIscORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984). For an overview of the developments leading to rationalist/institutionalist regime theory, see Slaughter Burley, supranote

41, at 207-227.
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A. Some Assumptions ofthe InstitutionalistApproach

The institutionalist approach is a variant of the realist theory of
international politics. It thus shares with this theory many assumptions
concerning the international system.43 First, because no higher authority
binds individual states, the international system is anarchic. Second,
states are the primary actors in the international system, and they act
rationally to maximize their power. Third, states functions as "black
boxes," in the sense that the internal politics of each state are separable
from its activities in the international system." On these assumptions,
a state's behavior in the international system can be predicted from the
parameters of the system itself and the actions of other states in the
system.
The institutionalist view treats international regimes as collective
action problems between rational state actors.4" On this view, international regimes will arise where states must coordinate their behavior in
order to achieve a desired outcome. Such a situation might arise where
uncoordinated calculations of self-interest will generate a non-Paretooptimal outcome (such as the classic prisoner's dilemma) or even lead
to disastrous results, or where an issue area is particularly complex.46
The following are typical examples of what institutionalist scholars
consider to be regimes: international trade or money regimes (such as
the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund),
security regimes (such as arms control agreements or the United Nations
Security Council), and standardization regimes (such as the International
Civil Aviation Organization, the adoption of a common gauge of railroad

43. For a more thorough outline ofthe realist theory ofinternational relations, see HANS
J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS -THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 320(6th ed. 1985); KENNETHWALT4THEORYOFINTERNATIONALRELATIONS 118(1979).
Morgenthau notes: "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through
the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms ofpower."

MORGENTHAU, supra, at 5. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, The LiberalAgenda for
Peace: InternationalRelations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, in

PREFERRED FUTURES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 69-110 (Saul H. Mendlovitz & Bums H.
Weston eds., 1995).
44. Stephen D. Krasner gives a more concise version of the realist assumptions: an
international system is one of "functionally symmetrical, power-maximizing states acting
in an anarchic environment." Krasner, supra note 41, at 2.
45. There are interesting parallels between international regime theory and the general
theories of social control described by Robert C. Ellickson. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW - How NEIGHBORS SETTE DispuTEs 123-240 (1991). To the
extent that Professor Ellickson considers law (and hence the state) irrelevant to much of the
social order, the order which does arise on his view may resemble that predicted by regime
theory for the international system.
46. See Krasner, supranote 41, at 5-7.
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track in Western Europe, or the use of a standard calendar).47 Thus,
while there may be overlap between an international organization and an
international regime, the two do not necessarily coincide. This theory
has several variants; a full treatment of the differences among them is
beyond the scope of this paper.48 Yet even the broad outlines of the
institutionalist approach sketched here suggest that state participation in
international regimes can be explained in terms of such considerations
as lowering transaction costs and establishing uniform standards of
behavior.
B. Institutionalism and the Internet

Characterizing the Internet as an international regime seems
eminently plausible. Those states which have permitted Internet access
at all have implicitly agreed, at a minimum, to a set of technical
standards that facilitate the transmission of data over the Internet.49
Indeed, it would be almost prohibitively difficult for a single state to
declare its non-adherence to the TCP/IP system and remain connected to
the Internet. It has been suggested that states connected to the Internet
have implicitly agreed to more than mere technical standards. By
agreeing to connect to the Internet, the argument goes, the state has
acquiesced to a whole set of norms that strictly constrain regulation of
the Internet. Yet under our premise that states are capable of regulating
cyberspace, and that states act rationally to maximize their own power,
there is simply no reason to think that such a broad set of norms will be
respected. The power-maximizing state will let the Internet be free only
insofar as doing so serves the state's interest. Those norms for which
cooperation seems to facilitate the long-term interests of the state will
become the governing rule set of the regime, while all others will simply
be ignored. To understand which norms might fall into which category,
we must examine the structure of the Internet.5"
Similar to the logic of object-oriented computer programming, the
logical structure of the Internet consists of successive levels of abstrac-

47. Many of these examples are from Arthur A. Stein, Coordinationand Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supranote 43, at 115.
48. For a broad overview ofregime theory see INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supranote

41.
49. The most obvious examples of technical standards are the Internet Protocol (IP)
itself, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and the various other low-level standards
of the Internet.

50. The rule structure ofthe Internet is also the subject of extensive treatment in Post,
supra note 9.
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tion, each with a set of standards pertinent only to that level." Thus one
level of abstraction on the Internet may interact with other levels without
sharing the internal standards of any other level. Consider, for example,
the transmission of an e-mail message between hosts in different states.
At a low level, agreement on issues such as physical connections, the
Internet addressing system, and content-control protocols are necessary
for any transfer of data. At an intermediate level of abstraction,
agreement on issues such as a standard e-mail protocol and data
encryption is important. Finally, at the highest level of abstraction,
norms regarding message content become relevant - whether, for
example, the message contains forbidden speech. On this model, it
seems that the state's interest in imposing its own rules upon Internet
processes rises in direct proportion to the level of abstraction. Put
simply, the rational power-maximizing state will probably agree with the
"functional" (low-level) standards, but impose its own will on "political"
(high-level) norms.5 2 The abstractions model makes it possible for the
state to agree to do just this. 3

This analysis, however, ignores another set of costs associated with
imposing regulation. By hindering the speed and accessibility of the
Internet, state control over high-level norms will decrease the economic
and other expected benefits of participating in the Internet regime. For
example, in Singapore, the coercive use of proxy servers has slowed
down Internet access completely, and threatens Singapore's plans to

51. This system is formally defined by the International Standard Organization's Open
System Interconnect (ISO/OS1)model. The ISO/OSI model recognizes seven layers of

abstraction: physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, and application.
See
ISO/OSI Network Model
(last modified
June
28,
1996)
<http.//www.uwsg.indiana.edu/usail/network/nfs/network layers.hml>. Above these seven

layers, which are mostly (butnot completely) technical, one can imagine layers corresponding to the human rules and norms that are pertinent to the application in question (e.g., email norms or, more generally, human language).
52. Ofcourse, there are some very real controversies over the functional standards, so
to categorize them as totally non-political may be misleading.
53. Interestingly, one branch of international peace theory, known as the "functional
approach to peace" and exemplified in the writings of David Mitrany, holds that the
encouragement of non-political or functional interactions between states is the best way to
build lasting and stable international peace. See David Mitrany, The FunctionalApproach
to World Organization,in THE UNITED NATIONS AND A JUST WORLD ORDER 153 (Richard

A. Falk et al. eds., 1991). But see Inis L. Claude, Jr., SwoRDs INTO PLOWSHARES -THE
PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 378-407 (4th ed. 1984)

(criticizing the functional approach to peace). Mitrany's line of reasoning may be
interesting forthose who believe the Internet is essentially non-political and may have arole
in promoting world peace and unity.
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exploit the commercial potential of the Internet. 4 The institutionalist
model predicts that power-maximizing states will act to regulate
cyberspace as much as possible without threatening the other benefits
that the Internet delivers. Let C be the control the state exerts over
cyberspace, P the power it achieves in this way, and B the other benefits
of Internet participation. In general, P will be a positive function of C,
and B will be a negative function of C. The state will choose the C
which maximizes the sum of P and B. The precise relationship between
P, B, and C will shift depending on the technology used for Internet
regulation. Where available regulation technology is primitive, the
optimal level of Internet regulation will be low. As regulation technology becomes more advanced, however, the optimal level of Internet
regulation can be expected to increase. Since technology advances
directly with time, this model predicts a future of increasing state
regulation of cyberspace. The abstract structure of networks, moreover,
can facilitate this regulation by allowing states to pick and choose the
norms over which it wants to exercise control without forfeiting
participation in the Internet regime as a whole.
There has been some movement to regulate the Internet through
international treaty. In the European Union, the Council of Ministers
recently endorsed a French proposal for a "Charter for International
Cooperation on the Internet."5 The French Minister for Infornation
Technology expressed hope that the initiative would lead eventually to
an accord comparable to the international law of the sea. 6 Such a
charter would make the Internet look more like the international regimes
familiar to institutionalist theorists.
C. Problemswith the InstitutionalistApproach
as Applied to the Internet
Leaving aside the more general criticisms of the institutionalist
approach in international relations theory,5 7 we may note at least two
reasons to think that institutionalist analysis may fail to yield a satisfying
picture of Internet sovereignty. First of all, the institutionalist approach

54. See Not Too Modern, Please: Asia and the Internet, THE ECONOMIsT, Mar. 16,

1996, at 42 (noting the tension between the desire ofAsian states to exploit the commercial
potential ofthe Internet and the desire to regulate it). On the definition ofproxy servers, see
supranote 22.

55. For the full text of the resolution endorsing France's proposal, see Council of
Ministers Press Release, 1972d Council Meeting, Nov. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Txtnws File.
56. See FranceSeeks GlobalInternetRules, REtrrERS WORLD SERv., Jan. 31, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws file.
57. For a complete criticism, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 41, at 225-27.
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focuses on the actions of state actors and state regulators. While no
discussion of sovereignty can proceed without including state actors, the
complete exclusion of individuals and other entities in cyberspace makes
the analysis incomplete. It is, after all, not really states that make use of
the Internet, but individuals. Few of the international interactions that
occur as part of the Internet regime are strictly between states, and it is
with such interactions that the realist paradigm is primarily concerned.
Second, the realist assumption that states are power-maximizing and
homogenous seems inappropriate in the Internet context. Clearly,
differing attitudes towards the pre-existing norms of the Internet will lead
to widely disparate regimes. The attitudes of "founding" countries like
the United States is profoundly different from that of countries for whom
the Internet is a somewhat awkward recent arrival.5 8 Furthermore,
internal considerations such as political processes and preferences may
play a large role in determining a state's Internet policy. By examining
only external constraints, the realist model ignores these considerations.
The institutionalist analysis of Internet regulation will be most
applicable where the behavior of states adheres closely to the realist
assumptions of the model. Thus where a state consciously adopts an
instrumentalist view of the Internet and deliberately seeks to restrict its
use to, for example, what it perceives as economically beneficial
purposes, the institutionalist predictions may be accurate. So far,
however, there seem to be only a few states that have approached the
Internet in this fashion. 9 We now turn to the liberal theory.
IV. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND THE INTERNET
A. Assumptions of the LiberalTheory
The liberal theory makes three assumptions about the international
system.' First, the primary actors in the system are the individuals who
constitute domestic societies or groups.6' Thus liberal theory treats
society as analytically prior to the state. Second, governments represent
some segment of domestic society."2 In consequence, state actions are
58. For a description ofglobal reactions and attempts to regulate the Internet, see Amy
Knoll, Any Which Way But Loose: NationsRegulate the Internet,4 TUL. J. INT'L& COMP.
L. 275 (1996).
59. See supranotes 30-34 and accompanying text.
60. See Andrew Moravcsik, TakingPreferencesSeriously: A PositiveLiberalTheory
ofInternationalPolitics,INT'L ORG., (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 4-9, on file with
the author).
61. See id. at 4-5.
62. See id. at 6-7.
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seen as a reflection of the interests of that group, expressed through those
domestic institutions which link state and society. 3 Finally, and
following naturally from the first two assumptions, state behavior will be
64
determined by the configuration and the nature of state preferences.
This shifts the emphasis away from state power and external constraints,
and towards state purpose and the pattern of demand for international
outcomes. Under the liberal theory, these are the essential elements of
the international system.
The emphasis on individualized state preferences and heterogeneity
leads to significant contrasts between the liberal and institutionalist
theories in their predictions concerning relations between like-minded
and non-like-minded states." In particular, liberal theory imagines that
the kind of cooperation involved in more comprehensive international
regimes (like the European Union) depends on states' sharing certain
preferences rather than presenting rational solutions to collective action
problems.' Liberal theory reconceptualizes sovereignty as a much more
flexible proposition, especially between like-minded states. This is in
stark contrast to a realist "billiard-ball" model of state sovereignty, where
state power is sealed in at national borders, and doled out to international
regimes only when doing so serves the rational interest of the state.
B. The Shape of CyberspaceSovereignty underLiberal Theory
Assuming that the states of the world possess effective power to
regulate the Internet, to what degree does the liberal theory predict that
cyberspace will be left alone? The first observation is that the answer
will be different for every state, because states are presumed to be
heterogeneous and act according to individualized preferences. Under
the liberal model, in some countries cyberspace may be left to govern
itself, while in others the government will regulate heavily. Which way
the state behaves will depend on whose interests the state apparatus
happens to represent. This observation conforms fairly well to the

63. See id Various types of governance will give different expressions of society's
interests, ranging from tyranny to pure democracy. See id.
64. See id at 7-9. In the words of Andrew Moravcsik, "what states do is determined
by what they want." Id.
65. Evidence often cited to support this proposition includes the apparent tendency of
democratic states not to go to war with each other. See generally BRUCE RussETr,
GRASPING THE DEmOcRATIc PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR APOST-COLD WAR WORLD (1995).

66. See Slaughter Burley, supranote 41, at 228-30. Professor Slaughter uses the term
"sovereignty paradox" to describe this reconceptualization of sovereignty among liberal
states that nonetheless maintains a more traditional sovereignty-based view of relations
between liberal and non-liberal states at the political level.
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observed practice at present, where the degree of regulation varies
immensely among nation states. 67
As under the institutionalist view, it is useful to think of the Internet
less as a place and more as a regime of transnational norms and rules (a
logical counterpart to transnational law) that regulates international
interactions between individuals. These norms and rules may be
formally constituted, such as the Internet standards promulgated by the
Internet Engineering Task Force,6" or informal, such as the discourse
norms on the Usenet.69 Such preexisting norms and rules may in
themselves generate state behavior that would respect cyberspace
sovereignty. Thus cyberspace sovereignty may spring from a consensus
among individuals in different states that these rules and norms are
reasonable and deserve respect. At the second stage, domestic institu-

tions may transmit this consensus to the state, and a respect for these
norms and rules may become a state preference. As Professor Slaughter
notes, transnational rules can "structure patterns of individual and group
interaction in transnational society, patterns that in turn generate interests
that shape and constrain state action."7 At the third stage, states will
modify their behavior in such a way that its actions through code and law
include a respect for those norms and rules that it now respects. 7' The
result of this process is a minimally sovereign cyberspace, where the

67. See Knoll, supranote 58, at 279-99.
68. For adiscussion ofthe constitution and innerworkings ofthe Internet Engineering
Task Force, see generally Paulina Borsook, HowAnarchy Works, WIRED, Oct. 1995, at 110.
69. For a discussion of informally constituted community norms on the Internet, see
generally HowARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993).

70. Slaughter Burley, supranote 41, at 230.
71. This process is familiar in the development of international norms. For example,
international human rights norms have tended to spread quickly among the nations that are
among the originators, are more slowly to non-like minded states. Interestingly, certain
humanrights non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") have adopted Internet freedom as
ahuman rights norm, and now press for its respect. The NGOs usually incorporate calls for
Internet freedom as part of the right of communication in Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas throughany mediaand regardlessoffrontiers."
UniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71, 74-75
(1948) (emphasis added). For an example of an NGO taking action for the cause of Intemet
freedom, see Letter from Human Rights Watch Asia to George Yeo, Minister for
Information and the Arts, Singapore (August 13, 1996) (protesting Singapore's controls on
Internet use). Even members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee have
protested Singapore's censorship of the Internet. See Ray Health, Lion Closes Net on
Rogue Dites, S. CHmAMORNINGPOST, Sept. 20,1996, at 3 (describing the criticism leveled
by Senator Russ Feingold at Singapore's censorship of sites critical ofits government); see
also MARK B. FELDMAN, THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TOWARDS A LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS 343 (Anne W. Branscomb ed., 1986).
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extent of sovereignty corresponds precisely to what the consensus holds
to be the proper breadth of freedom from state regulation.
Let us look first at the consensus which serves as the starting point
for cyberspace sovereignty under the liberal theory.72 Individuals, even
in the same country, will obviously have disparate views concerning
such issues as state interference with freedom of expression. In
consequence, their ideas of the appropriate level of Internet regulation
will vary. This variation will be even greater among individuals in
different states. Therefore, the Internet consensus will be the minimally
acceptable set of norms and rules upon which reasonable individual can
agree. In practice, the extent of a consensus is likely to be limited in
various ways. As noted above, the consensus will likely be broader with
respect to "traffic rules," or standards towards the lower end of the
abstract structure of the Internet. As for higher-level norms, there are
likely to be at least two important constraints. First, where actions in
cyberspace have negative secondary effects on real space, a consensus
against state regulation of such actions is improbable. For example, most
people are likely to agree that control of criminal activity is still the
domain of the state. Second, the norms will be more readily accepted by
individuals in the United States and similar societies. Because of the
pattern of the Internet's growth, most of the currently existing norms
have been established by individuals from the United States and likeminded countries; thus the norms of those countries can be felt strongly
in the higher-level norms and rules of cyberspace.
In a sense, it is the development of such a consensus that is the true
project of the proponents of cyberspace sovereignty. Widespread respect
for the Internet regime depends on the reasonableness of the norms and
rules proposed, and of the cyberspace institutions that promulgate them.
Thus Professors Post and Johnson rightly stress that freedom from state
regulation rests on the development of "responsible law making institutions" in cyberspace."
What seems untenable, by contrast, is the
absolutism of those who claim that state regulation of the Internet is per
se unacceptable.74 While this conception of cyberspace sovereignty

72. This notion ofoverlapping consensus is taken extremely loosely from John Rawls.
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1996).
73. Johnson & Post, supranote 5, at 1390.
74. This approach is adopted, for example, by John Barlow. See supra note 1.
Professors Johnson and Post, to their credit, do advocate a more balanced approach, arguing
that the law of sovereigns in the physical world should "defer to this new form of selfgovernment" when cyberspace rules "do!] not fundamentally impinge upon the vital
interests of others who do never visit this new space." Johnson & Post, supra note 5, at
1394. However, they go too far when they claim that the desire of states to regulate
obscenity and its effects is subservient to a "meta-interest" in preserving the free flow of
information. See id.
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certainly has some resonance in the Western world, the foregoing
analysis suggests that it is misbegotten with respect to the world at large.
For example, appeals to free speech protection of the type guaranteed
under the First Amendment will fall on deaf ears in many countries. The
proper view, then, is to work toward a level of state regulation about
which individuals of widely varying beliefs and world-views can agree.
Finally, cyberspace institutions must concede that local governments will
have legitimate interests in regulating certain activities and content.
Next, let us consider the transmission of this consensus to the level
of state preference. Here, another set of limitations is implicit.
Depending on the governing structure, the interests of those who share
an international cyberspace consensus may not be adopted as state
policy. In a dictatorship, for example, the state's acceptance of Internet
sovereignty would depend only on the extent to which the dictator
himself believes that the norms and rules of cyberspace deserve respect.
Other countries may have other peculiarities in the process of transmitting interests to the government (e.g., powerful lobbies) that affect which
interests will determine behavior. Therefore, even in the face of a strong
individual consensus that a certain Internet norm deserves recognition by
nation states, certain states may nonetheless refuse to adopt the norm.
This leaves us with a generative model of a minimally sovereign
cyberspace. It is generative in the sense that it entails a process by which
the norms and rules of cyberspace may become respected by a significant
number of states. It is minimal in the sense that the only rules and norms
likely to gain the acceptance of most states will be those that individuals
of widely varying persuasions find acceptable. At this nascent stage of
the Internet's influence on mainstream society, cyberspace retains a high
degree of independence simply for reasons of inertia. The governments
of the world have only begun to express their preferences, and what kind
of cyberspace sovereignty will be respected remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION

States, their governments, and their citizens ought never be taken for
granted as players in cyberspace. It is easy, given the current state of the
Internet, to assume that it is and will remain free of external regulation.
However, it would be incorrect to adopt such an assumption. A quick
empirical look suggests that it is possible to regulate the Internet, and that
countries, corporations, organizations, and private individuals are already
doing so. This Note has not directly addressed the question of whether
regulation of cyberspace by governments is right or wrong. Where states
are simply acting to maximize their own power, this question may have
little practical relevance. However, as the last Part demonstrates, how
individuals feel about this question and whether their interests are
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expressed by the state may be crucial in determining the future of
cyberspace regulation. The onus, then, is on the developing institutions
of cyberspace to develop norms and rules that make sense and will gain
broad acceptance internationally.

